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11 Introduction
The theory of fair allocation studies allocation rules which select, for every
economy in a given class, a subset off easible allocations on the basis ofeﬃ-
ciency and fairness properties. It was initiated by Foley (1967), Kolm (1972)
and Varian (1974) among others, who focussed on the concept of no-envy.
Since then it has been extended to cover many other notions off airness and a
great variety ofeconomic contexts (production, public goods, etc.) by many
authors.1 This theory contains some negative results, because it is usually
impossible to ﬁnd solutions which satisfy all conceivable requirements of ef-
ﬁciency and equity simultaneously, but its hallmark is a richness ofpositive
results. By now, not only are there many interesting allocation rules uncov-
ered in the literature, but also they are fully characterized as the only rules
satisfying some sets of reasonable axioms.
Compared to the theory ofsocial choice, this makes a great contrast. In
social choice theory, Arrow’s impossibility theorem has been shown to remain
valid in most economic or abstract contexts. This theorem, like all the theory
ofsocial choice, is about social pref erences which rank all options in a given
set on the basis ofindividual pref erences over these options. The theorem
states that there is no way to construct social preferences as a function of
individual preferences if this function is required to satisfy basic principles
ofunanimity (Weak Pareto: ifeverybody pref ers x to y, so does society),
impartiality (Non-Dictatorship: no individual can always impose his strict
preferences) and informational parsimony (Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives: social preferences over any subset of alternatives depend only on
individual preferences over this subset).
Impossibilities in social choice theory, possibilities in fair allocation the-
ory. This contrast requires an explanation. Most authors have stressed two
diﬀerences between the two theories. The one most often mentioned is about
preferences versus selection. Varian (1974) argues as follows:
‘Social [choice] theory asks for too much out of the process in
that it asks for an entire ordering ofthe various social states (al-
locations in this case). The original question asked only for a
“good” allocation; there was no requirement to rank all alloca-
tions. The fairness criterion in fact limits itself to answering the
original question. It is limited in that it gives no indication ofthe
1For a survey, see Moulin and Thomson (1997).
2merits oftwo nonf air allocations, but by restricting itselfin this
way it allows for a reasonable solution to the original problem.’
(p. 65)
Similarly, Kolm (1996) is ironic about social preferences:
‘The requirement ofa social ordering is indeed problematic at ﬁrst
sight: Why would we want to know the 193th best alternative?
Only the ﬁrst best is required for the choice.’ (p. 439)
In his famous survey on social choice theory, Sen (1986) also emphasizes
this contrast:
‘The speciﬁed subset is seen as good, but there is no claim
that they represent the “best” alternatives, all equally choosable.
There is no attempt to give an answer to the overall problem of
social choice, and the exercise is quite diﬀerent from the speciﬁ-
cation ofa social pref erence over X.’ (p. 1106)
And most recently, Moulin and Thomson (1997) have compared the two
theories in these terms:
‘In social choice theory, the focus is commonly on obtaining a
complete ranking of the set of feasible alternatives as a function
ofthe proﬁle ofindividual pref erences. (...) Consider now the
axiomatic investigations ofresource allocation. As their counter-
parts in the theory ofcooperative games, their f ocus is on the
search for allocation rules, no attempt being made at obtaining
a complete ranking ofthe entire f easible set.’ (p. 104)
The second diﬀerence noticed by these authors is that economic models
enable the analyst to take account ofthe structure ofallocations. Varian
mentions only the fact that the theory of fairness can focus on self-centered
preferences (individuals being interested only in their own consumption),
while Sen has written about the fairness literature:
‘First, it has shown the relevance ofinf ormational parameters
that the traditional social choice approaches have tended to ig-
nore in the single-minded concern with individual orderings of
3complete social states. Comparisons ofdiﬀerent persons’ positions
within a state have been brought into the calculation, enlarging
the informational basis of social judgments. Second, in raising
rather concrete questions regarding states ofaﬀairs, the f airness
literature has pushed social choice theory in the direction ofmore
structure.’ (p. 1111)
Similarly, Moulin and Thomson have argued that
‘the models ofresource allocation take f ull account ofthe mi-
croeconomic structure ofthe problems to be solved. (...) This
descriptive richness permits a great deal ofﬂexibility at two lev-
els. First, properties ofallocation rules can be f ormulated directly
in terms ofthe physical attributes ofthe economy (...). Second,
the rich mathematical structure ofmicroeconomic models gives
rise to a host ofvariations on each general principle.’ (p. 105)
However, this second diﬀerence is about additional requirements formu-
lated in a richer framework, and can hardly explain the relative success of
the theory off airness. This was noted by Moulin and Thomson, who have
concluded:
‘Note that social choice theory itselfhas recently developed in a
similar direction, widening its framework by incorporating infor-
mation about economic environments (...). But as its objective
has remained to obtain complete rankings ofsets off easible al-
ternatives, its conclusions have so far remained largely negative.’
(ibid.)
Actually, Arrow’s initial presentation ofhis theorem (Arrow 1950, 1951)
was already formulated in an economic setting, with self-centered preferences.
Therefore one can safely conclude that the common explanation for the pos-
sibility results in the theory of fairness is that it does not seek a full-ﬂedged
ordering.
The problem we address in this paper is that this common explanation
is technically incomplete and therefore unconvincing. An allocation rule,
in eﬀect, splits the set ofallocations in two parts, the good and the bad.
Even though the ambition is not to give an ordering ofallocations, this
twofold partition is, formally, an ordering. A coarse ordering is still an
4ordering. It is a partial ordering ifthe good allocations are deemed non-
comparable, and similarly for the bad ones, as suggested above by Varian
and Sen. But one may also consider that it gives a complete ordering simply
by declaring all good allocations, and respectively all bad allocations, to be
socially equivalent. We will later refer to these two interpretations as the
“partial ordering” version and the “complete ordering” version, respectively.
Ifall the allocation rules in the theory off airness yield orderings, it re-
mains totally unexplained why and how the theory off air allocation avoids
Arrow’s impossibility. There may be some truth in the idea that a coarse or-
dering is more easily constructed than a ﬁne-grained one, but one cannot say
that a coarse ordering is not an ordering and is outside the reach ofArrow’s
theorem.
As a consequence, the only convincing explanation for the possibility
results in fair allocation theory must be based on the violation of some
conditions ofArrow’s theorem. The ﬁrst candidate, among Arrow’s con-
ditions, is completeness ofthe ordering. This is in line with the “partial
ordering” interpretation ofallocation rules. The problem is that under the
“complete ordering” interpretation, allocation rules do provide complete or-
derings. Therefore this cannot be the desired explanation.2 Ifone can derive
complete orderings from the theory of fairness, the explanation must be that
this theory violates one ofthe three core axioms ofArrow’s theorem: Weak
Pareto, Non-Dictatorship, or Independence ofIrrelevant Alternatives.
These three axioms will be formally deﬁned in the next sections, after the
model and notations are introduced. The main conclusion that will be derived
in this paper is that the theory of fairness succeeds in obtaining possibility
results mainly because it abandons the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives. It relies on more information about individual preferences (at
“irrelevant” alternatives) than allowed by this axiom. This idea was already
informally put forth by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996), who claimed more-
over that the kind of additional information used by the theory of fairness
would be enough to get round Arrow’s impossibility in the theory ofsocial
choice as well.
Here we will show, however, that relaxing Weak Pareto is also part ofthe
2Moreover, Weymark (1984) has studied the application of Arrow’s axioms to partial
orderings, and obtained oligarchy results. More interestingly, by adding anonymity to the
axioms, he characterized the Pareto partial ordering. Although his results are obtained in
an abstract framework with unrestricted preferences, they strongly suggest that little can
be gained by abandoning completeness.
5picture, and this is an inevitable consequence ofthe f act that the ordering
is coarse. Our analysis will therefore show that there is some truth in the
usual explanation. More precisely, coarse orderings naturally suggest weak-
enings ofthe Weak Pareto principle which make it less necessary to depart
from Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. With the full Weak Pareto
principle for social orderings, avoiding Arrow’s impossibility would require a
more drastic weakening ofthe independence condition. Theref ore our sec-
ond important conclusion will be that the theory of social choice needs more
information than the theory of fair allocation, although both need to relax
the independence condition. This part ofour analysis will rely heavily on
a companion paper which studies how much weakening ofthe independence
condition is required in the theory ofsocial choice (Fleurbaey, Suzumura and
Tadenuma 2001).
The paper has the following structure. The next section introduces the
model and the main notions. Allocation rules are confronted to Arrow’s
axioms in Section 3. In Section 4 we then discuss some weak variants of
Independence ofIrrelevant Alternatives. Section 5 presents the main results,
and Section 6 compares the informational basis of the theory of fairness
to that ofsocial choice theory. In Section 7 we propose a uniﬁed theory
ofsocial choice and f airness, and discuss the relative merits ofalternative
“grand uniﬁcation” theories. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model and deﬁnitions
2.1 The model
The population is ﬁxed. Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of agents where
2 ≤ n<∞. There are   goods indexed by k =1 ,...,  where 2 ≤  <∞. Agent
i’s consumption bundle is a vector xi =( xi1,...,xi ) ∈ R 
+. An allocation is
denoted x =( x1,...,xn) ∈ Rn 
+ .
A preordering is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation. Agent i’s
preferences are described by a complete preordering Ri (strict preference Pi,
indiﬀerence Ii)o nR 
+. A proﬁle of preferences is denoted R =( R1,...,Rn).
Let R be the set ofcontinuous, convex, and strictly monotonic pref erences
over R 
+.
Let π be a bijection on N. For each x ∈ Rn 




+ by x 
i = xπ(i) for all i ∈ N, and for each R ∈R n, deﬁne π(R)=
6(R 
1,...,R 
n) ∈R n by R 
i = Rπ(i) for all i ∈ N. Let Π be the set ofall
bijections on N.
There is no production in our model, and the amount of total resources
is ﬁxed and represented by the vector ω ∈ R 




i∈N xi ≤ ω.3 Let F be the set ofall f easible allocations.
For each R ∈R n, let E(R) denote the set of Pareto-eﬃcient allocations.
Because ofstrict monotonicity ofpref erences, there is no need to distinguish
Pareto-eﬃciency in the strong sense and in the weak sense.
A social ordering function (SOF) is a function ¯ R deﬁned on Rn, such
that for all R ∈R n, ¯ R(R) is a complete preordering on the set ofallocations
F. Let ¯ P(R) (resp. ¯ I(R)) denote the strict preference (resp. indiﬀerence)
relation derived from ¯ R(R).
An allocation rule (AR) is a set-valued mapping S deﬁned on Rn, such
that4 for all R ∈R n,S(R) is a non-empty subset of F.A nA RS is essentially
single-valued ifall selected allocations are Pareto-indiﬀerent:
∀x,y ∈ S(R),∀i ∈ N, xi Ii yi.
To each AR S can be associated the (two-tier) SOF ¯ RS deﬁned as follows:
for all R ∈R n, and all x,y ∈ F,
x ¯ RS(R) y ⇔ x ∈ S(R)o ry/ ∈ S(R).
One then has: for all R ∈R n, and all x,y ∈ F,
x ¯ PS(R) y ⇔ not[y ¯ RS(R) x] ⇔ x ∈ S(R) and y/ ∈ S(R).
When a SOF has only two indiﬀerence classes, and is therefore associated to
an AR, we will call it an ARSOF. We will say that an ARSOF is essentially
single-valued ifits associated AR is essentially single-valued.
Conversely, from any SOF ¯ R, we can derive the AR S ¯ R by selecting the
subset ofﬁrst best allocations: f or all R ∈R n,
S ¯ R(R)={x ∈ F |∀ y ∈ F, x ¯ R(R) y}.
By the deﬁnitions, we have, for any AR S :
S ¯ RS = S.
3Vector inequalities are denoted as usual: ≥,>,and  .
4An alternative deﬁnition of SOFs and ARs makes them a function of ω as well as R.
This is useful when changes in ω are studied, but here we focus only on the information
about preferences, and since ω is kept ﬁxed throughout the paper, we omit this argument.
72.2 Arrow’s axioms
We are now ready to give precise deﬁnitions ofArrow’s three conditions.
Weak Pareto: ∀R ∈R n,∀x,y ∈ F, if ∀i ∈ N, xiPiyi, then x ¯ P(R)y.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): ∀R,R  ∈R n,∀x,y ∈
F, if ∀i ∈ N,
xi Ri yi ⇔ xi R
 
i yi
yi Ri xi ⇔ yi R
 
i xi,
then x ¯ R(R) y ⇔ x ¯ R(R ) y.
In economic domains, it is common to reﬁne the deﬁnition ofnon-
dictatorship so as to allow for slight strengthenings of the usual axiom. Let
X ⊂ F be any subset ofallocations.
Non-Dictatorship (over X): There does not exist i0 ∈ N such that:
∀R ∈R
n,∀x,y ∈ X,xi0 Pi0 yi0 ⇒ x ¯ P(R) y.
In addition to these axioms, it will be useful to refer to a full anonymity
condition, which is stronger than Non-Dictatorship but quite appealing on
grounds ofimpartiality:
Anonymity: ∀R ∈R n,∀x,y ∈ F,∀π ∈ Π,
x ¯ R(R) y ⇔ π(x) ¯ R(π(R)) π(y).
3 Allocation rules and Arrow’s axioms
In this section, we examine how ARSOFs, as a particular kind ofSOFs, f are
with respect to satisfying Arrow’s axioms.
Let us start with the last one. The Anonymity axiom raises no diﬃculty
to ARSOFs, and it is worth noticing that it then actually boils down to the
following simple condition:
Anonymity for S ¯ R: ∀π ∈ Π,∀R ∈R n,∀x ∈ S ¯ R(R),π (x) ∈ S ¯ R(π(R)).
It is interesting that, moreover, the Non-Dictatorship axiom will (for suf-
ﬁciently large X) always be trivially satisﬁed by ARSOFs, since it is impos-
sible for any agent to impose his ﬁne-grained preferences to a coarse social
ordering.
8The Weak Pareto principle, by contrast, cannot be satisﬁed by ARSOFs.
Since there usually are many occurrences ofPareto-domination among Pareto
ineﬃcient allocations, this axiom requires a too ﬁne-grained ranking ofallo-
cations. Hence, ARSOFs usually satisfy only weakenings of the Weak Pareto
principle. Notice ﬁrst that the original Weak Pareto principle for ARSOFs
can be written as:
Weak Pareto for ARSOF: ∀R ∈R n,∀x,y ∈ F, if ∀i ∈ N, xi Pi yi, then
x ∈ S ¯ R(R) and y/ ∈ S ¯ R(R).5
A priori, one may consider three kinds ofweakenings ofthis original
axiom, depending on whether the conclusion ofthe weakened axiom retains:
(α) y/ ∈ S ¯ R(R)
(β) x ∈ S ¯ R(R)
(γ) x ∈ S ¯ R(R)o ry/ ∈ S ¯ R(R).
Note that
(i) (α) ⇒ (γ), and (β) ⇒ (γ), and
(ii) (γ) ⇔ x¯ R(R)y.
This yields three diﬀerent axioms, which we now examine in turn.
Weak Weak Pareto α: ∀R ∈R n,∀x,y ∈ F, if ∀i ∈ N, xi Pi yi, then
y/ ∈ S ¯ R(R).
This axiom is the most relevant weakening ofWeak Pareto f or our purposes,
because it is equivalent to one ofthe f undamental axioms in the theory of
fair allocation, namely:
Pareto-Eﬃciency: ∀R ∈R n,S ¯ R(R) ⊆ E(R).
The second weakening ofWeak Pareto is the f ollowing:
Weak Weak Pareto β: ∀R ∈R n,∀x,y ∈ F, if ∀i ∈ N, xi Pi yi, then
x ∈ S ¯ R(R).
This is equivalent to: ∀R ∈R n,
S ¯ R(R) ⊇{ x ∈ F |∃ y ∈ F,∀i ∈ N, xi Pi yi}.
That is, S ¯ R(R) must contain all feasible allocations that Pareto dominate
some feasible allocations. This is not reasonable. The third weakening,
5Recall that
x¯ P(R)y ⇔ x ∈ S ¯ R(R) and y/ ∈ S ¯ R(R).
9however, is logically weaker than Weak Weak Pareto α and deserves some
attention:
Weak Weak Pareto γ: ∀R ∈R n,∀x,y ∈ F, if ∀i ∈ N, xi Pi yi, then
x ∈ S ¯ R(R)o ry/ ∈ S ¯ R(R).
This is equivalent to the following condition: ∀R ∈R n,∀x,y ∈ F, if ∀i ∈
N, xiPiyi, then y ∈ S ¯ R(R) ⇒ x ∈ S ¯ R(R). Ifan ARSOF ¯ R satisﬁes this
condition, then for each R ∈R n, there exists T ⊆ F such that
S ¯ R(R) ⊇

y∈T
[{y}∪{ x ∈ F |∀ i ∈ N, xi Pi yi}].
If T ⊆ E(R), then S ¯ R(R) ⊆ E(R), which is the same implication as Weak
Weak Pareto α.I fT ⊇ F, then S ¯ R(R) ⊇{ x ∈ F |∃ y ∈ F,∀i ∈ N, xi Pi yi},
the same implication as Weak Weak Pareto β.
Weak Weak Pareto α and Weak Weak Pareto γ have been introduced in
Suzumura (1980), under the denominations ofExclusion Pareto and Inclusion
Pareto, respectively. There are interesting ARSOFs satisfying Weak Weak
Pareto γ but not Weak Weak Pareto α. For instance, deﬁne




i.e., S ¯ R(R) is the set ofindividually rational allocations f rom the equal






Let us ﬁnally consider IIA. For an ARSOF, this axiom is quite demanding,
since it requires that ifan allocation is selected while another is not, this
does not change when individual preferences relative to these two allocations
remain the same, independently ofpref erences over other allocations. It may
be useful to write down this condition explicitly in order to make this point
clear:
IIA for ARSOFs: ∀R,R  ∈R n, ∀x,y ∈ F,
if ∀i ∈ N,
xi Ri yi ⇔ xi R
 
i yi
yi Ri xi ⇔ yi R
 
i xi,
then [x ∈ S ¯ R(R) and y/ ∈ S ¯ R(R)] ⇔ [x ∈ S ¯ R(R ) and y/ ∈ S ¯ R(R )].
10For ARSOFs, the above axiom is rigorously equivalent to the original IIA
axiom. This may be understood by checking that IIA can equivalently be
written with the conclusion
x ¯ P(R) y ⇔ x ¯ P(R
 ) y
instead of
x ¯ R(R) y ⇔ x ¯ R(R
 ) y
and recalling that
x ¯ P(R) y ⇔ x ∈ S ¯ R(R) and y/ ∈ S ¯ R(R).
4 IIA and Weak Weak Pareto
The fact that IIA for ARSOFs is very strong is captured in the following re-
sult, which says that it implies that social preferences are totally independent
ofindividual pref erences.
Proposition 1 An ARSOF ¯ R satisﬁes IIA if and only if S ¯ R is a constant
function.
Proof. It is obvious that a constant ARSOF satisﬁes IIA. For the converse,
choose i0 ∈ N and deﬁne x0 ∈ F by x0
i0 = ω (and x0
i = 0 for all i  = i0). If
for all R ∈R n one has S(R)=F, then S is a constant function. Suppose
then that this is not the case, and let R ∈R n be such that S(R)  = F.
First case: x0 ∈ S(R). Take any y/ ∈ S(R). By monotonicity ofpref er-
ences, for all R  ∈R n,
∀i ∈ N, x
0




i yi and yi Ri x
0





Therefore x0 ∈ S(R ) and y/ ∈ S(R ). The latter implies F\S(R) ⊂ F\S(R ).
Since x0 ∈ S(R ), one can show by a symmetrical argument that F \S(R ) ⊂
F \ S(R) implying S(R )=S(R).
Second case: x0 / ∈ S(R). Take any x ∈ S(R). By monotonicity ofpref er-
ences, for all R  ∈R n,
∀i ∈ N, x
0




i xi and xi Ri x
0





11Therefore x0 / ∈ S(R ) and x ∈ S(R ). Hence, S(R) ⊂ S(R ). Similarly, by
a symmetrical argument based on x0 / ∈ S(R ), one can show that S(R ) ⊂
S(R).
Contrary to what one might expect, this does not exactly entail an Arro-
vian impossibility. In fact, there are ARSOFs satisfying IIA and Weak Weak
Pareto principles. Let us ﬁrst examine the implication ofIIA together with
the weakest ofour Weak Pareto principles, namely Weak Weak Pareto γ.
Let F ∗ be the set off easible allocations with no zero bundle:
F
∗ = {x ∈ F |∀ i ∈ N, xi  =0 }.
The message ofthe f ollowing proposition is that even with the weakest version
ofthe Weak Pareto principle, under IIA we are not allowed much room to
consider various ARSOFs.
Proposition 2 If an ARSOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Weak Pareto γ and IIA, then
either for all R ∈R n,
S ¯ R(R) ⊆{ x ∈ F |∃ i ∈ N, xi = ω}
or for all R ∈R n,
F
∗ ⊆ S ¯ R(R).
Proof. Let R ∈R n be given. Suppose that
S ¯ R(R)   {x ∈ F |∃ i ∈ N, xi = ω},
that is, there exists y ∈ S ¯ R(R) such that for all i ∈ N, yi <ω .W e m a y
assume that y  = 0. For if y = 0, then there exists y  ∈ F such that y    0,
and hence for all j ∈ N, y 
j Pj yj. Since ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Weak Pareto γ,w e
have y  ∈ S ¯ R(R).
Thus, without loss ofgenerality, assume that 0 <y 1 <ω . We need to
show that F ∗ ⊆ S ¯ R(R).
Step 1: We show that intF ≡{ x ∈ F |∀ i ∈ N,xi   0}⊆S ¯ R(R).
Since 0 <y 1 <ω , there are k,m ∈{ 1,..., },k  = m such that y1k > 0
and y1m <ω m. Without loss ofgenerality, assume that y11 > 0 and y12 <ω 2.
Deﬁne z ∈ F as follows:
(1) z11 = 0 and z12 = ω2,
(2) for all i ∈ N with i  =1 ,zi1 = yi1 +
y11
n−1 and zi2 = 0, and
(3) for all j ∈ N and all k ∈{ 1,..., } with k  =1 ,2, zik = yik.
12Let R0 =( R0
1,...,R 0


























Then, for all j ∈ N, zj P0
j yj. Since ¯ R satisﬁes IIA, from Proposition 1, it
is a constant function. Hence, y ∈ S ¯ R(R0)=S ¯ R(R). Then, by Weak Weak
Pareto γ, z ∈ S ¯ R(R0).
To show that intF ⊆ S ¯ R(R), let t ∈ intF. Let R1 =( R1
1,...,R 1
n) be the




















m =1 (z1m − t1m)
t11
∀i ∈ N, i  =1 ,s i >

m =2 (zim − tim)
ti2
.
For all j ∈ N, tj P1
j zj. Because z ∈ S ¯ R(R0) and S ¯ R is constant, we have
z ∈ S ¯ R(R1). Then, by Weak Weak Pareto γ, t ∈ S ¯ R(R1). Hence, t ∈ S ¯ R(R).
Step 2: We show that F ∗ ⊆ S ¯ R(R).
Let y ∈ F ∗. Then, for all i ∈ N, yi  = 0. Let t ∈ intF be chosen so that
for each i ∈ N, there is k(i) ∈{ 1,..., } such that 0 <t ik(i) <y ik(i). Let
13R  =( R 
1,...,R  











m =k(i) (tim − yim)
yik(i) − tik(i)
.
For all i ∈ N, yi P 
i ti. Because t ∈ S ¯ R(R) and S ¯ R is constant, we have
t ∈ S ¯ R(R ). Then, by Weak Weak Pareto γ, y ∈ S ¯ R(R ). Hence, since S ¯ R is
constant, y ∈ S ¯ R(R).
With Pareto-Eﬃciency (Weak Weak Pareto α), which is stronger than
Weak Weak Pareto γ, one gets a full characterization of an ARSOF if
Anonymity is introduced, as stated in the following theorem. However, the
ARSOF thus characterized is special in that it selects allocations in which
one individual gets all resources. Then, the second part ofthe theorem shows
that a kind ofArrovian dictatorship is not f ar away. By replacing Anonymity
with essential single-valuedness, one gets a dictatorial ARSOF which always
gives all resources to the same individual.
Theorem 1 There is only one ARSOF ¯ R satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA
and Anonymity, namely:
∀R ∈R
n,S ¯ R(R)={x ∈ F |∃ i ∈ N, xi = ω}.
If an ARSOF ¯ R satisﬁes Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA and is essentially single-
valued, then
∃i ∈ N,∀R ∈R
n,S ¯ R(R)={x ∈ F | xi = ω}.
Proof. By Proposition 2 and Pareto-Eﬃciency, for all R ∈R n,
S ¯ R(R) ⊆{ x ∈ F |∃ i ∈ N, xi = ω}.
Since ¯ R is a constant, for all R,R  ∈R n,
{i ∈ N |∃ x ∈ S ¯ R(R),x i = ω} = {i ∈ N |∃ x ∈ S ¯ R(R
 ),x i = ω}.
Therefore Anonymity requires
{i ∈ N |∃ x ∈ S ¯ R(R),x i = ω} = N,
14whereas essential single-valuedness requires
{i ∈ N |∃ x ∈ S ¯ R(R),x i = ω} = {i0}
for some ﬁxed i0 ∈ N.
From Proposition 2, the second part ofTheorem 1 can be strengthened
by replacing Pareto-Eﬃciency with Weak Weak Pareto γ in the hypothesis.
It should then be noted that even with the weakest version ofWeak Pareto,
which does not require selected allocations to be Pareto-eﬃcient, IIA and
essential single-valuedness lead us to a dictatorial ARSOF.
Theorem 1 is interesting not only in its content but also in what it implies
about all allocation rules ofthe f airness literature. Since these rules typically
satisfy Pareto-Eﬃciency and Anonymity, and do not give all resources to one
individual, they must all violate IIA. Proposition 1 gave the same conclusion
even more immediately, since these allocation rules are not constant.
We will illustrate this important lesson with a couple ofexamples. In the
current framework, two prominent allocation rules have been identiﬁed by
the fairness literature. The ﬁrst one is the Egalitarian Walrasian AR SW,
deﬁned as follows: x ∈ SW(R)i fx ∈ F and there is p ∈ R 
++ such that for
all i ∈ N,
∀y ∈ R
 
+,p · y ≤ p · ω/n ⇒ xi Ri y.
Figure 1 shows how a change ofpref erences can alter the relative ranking
oftwo allocations x and y without modifying individual preferences over
these two allocations. In Figure 1a, x is selected and y is not, whereas the
contrary obtains in Figure 1b, even though in both cases i prefers allocation
y and j prefers allocation x.
The second prominent allocation rule is the Pazner-Schmeidler AR
(see Pazner and Schmeidler 1978) SPS, deﬁned by: x ∈ SPS(R)i fx ∈ E(R)
and there is α ∈ R+ such that for all i ∈ N,
xi Ii αω.
Figure 2 is very similar to Figure 1 and illustrates the same phenomenon






















































Figure 2: SPS violates IIA
5 Variants of Independence of Irrelevant Al-
ternatives
The analysis in the previous section has revealed that the success ofthe
theory of fairness is mainly due to departure from IIA. Then, one may ask
in what sense IIA is violated or, more precisely, what additional information
is taken into account by ARSOFs, that is forbidden by IIA.
In the theory ofsocial choice, the main approach with respect to inf or-
mation has been, following Sen (1970a, b) in particular, to introduce richer
information about utilities. The theory of fairness, in contrast, has remained
faithful to Arrow’s initial project and usually retains only ordinal and inter-
personally non-comparable information about preferences. If it introduces
more information, it is about preferences, not about utilities. That is, pref-
erences about “irrelevant” alternatives are taken into account by ARs.
16It is possible to weaken IIA so as to take account of“irrelevant” alter-
natives (but not utilities) by strengthening the premise ofthe axiom in an
appropriate way. This attempts brings us into several variants ofthe axiom,
which will be introduced now. And in so doing we rely here on previous
works by Hansson (1973), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996), and the compan-
ion paper Fleurbaey, Suzumura and Tadenuma (2001).
A ﬁrst kind ofadditional inf ormation is contained in the marginal rates
ofsubstitution at the allocations to be compared. For eﬃcient allocations,
shadow prices enable one to compute the relative implicit income shares of
diﬀerent agents, thereby potentially providing a relevant measure ofinequal-
ities in the distribution ofresources. Theref ore, taking account ofmarginal
rates ofsubstitution is a natural extension ofthe inf ormational basis ofsocial
choice theory in economic environments. Let C(xi,R i) denote the cone of
price vectors that support the upper contour set for Ri at xi :
C(xi,R i)={p ∈ R
  |∀ y ∈ R
 
+,p y= pxi ⇒ xiRiy}.
When preferences Ri are strictly monotonic, one has C(xi,R i) ⊂ R 
++ when-
ever xi   0.
One then can require the ranking oftwo allocations to depend on indi-
vidual preferences between these two allocations and also on marginal rates
ofsubstitution at these allocations, but on that only:
IIA except Marginal Rates of Substitution (IIA-MRS): ∀x,y ∈ F,
∀R,R  ∈R n, if ∀i ∈ N,
xi Ri yi ⇔ xi R
 
i yi









then x ¯ R(R) y ⇔ x ¯ R(R ) y.
Marginal rates ofsubstitution give an inﬁnitesimally local piece ofinf or-
mation about preferences at given allocations. A further extension of the
inf ormational basis allows the SOF to take account ofﬁnite parts ofindiﬀer-
ence hypersurfaces. The indiﬀerence sets are deﬁned as
I(xi,R i)={z ∈ R
 
+ | zI i xi}.
17It is natural to focus on the part of indiﬀerence sets which lies within the feasi-
ble set. However, when considering any pair ofallocations, the two allocations
may need diﬀerent amounts oftotal resources to be f easible and the global
set F need not be relevant in its entirety. Therefore we need to introduce the
following notions. The smallest amount of total resources which makes two
allocations x and y feasible can be deﬁned by ω(x,y)=( ω1(x,y),...,ω (x,y)),








For any vector t ∈ R 






+ | z ≤ t

.
The following axiom captures the idea that the ranking of two allocations
should depend only on the indiﬀerence sets, and on preferences over the
minimal subset in which the two allocations are feasible.
IIA except Indiﬀerence Sets on Feasible Allocations (IIA-ISFA):
∀x,y ∈ F, ∀R,R  ∈R n,i f∀i ∈ N,
I(xi,R i) ∩ Ω(ω(x,y)) = I(xi,R
 
i) ∩ Ω(ω(x,y))
I(yi,R i) ∩ Ω(ω(x,y)) = I(yi,R
 
i) ∩ Ω(ω(x,y)),
then x ¯ R(R) y ⇔ x ¯ R(R ) y.




Notice that IIA-MRS does not imply IIA-ISFA because the set I(xi,R i) ∩
Ω(ω(x,y)) does not always provide enough information to determine
C(xi,R i).6
It is also worthwhile here introducing a couple ofindependence conditions
for ARs, which are closely related to IIA and its variants. Such conditions
are quite common in the fairness literature. We will formulate them here for
ARSOFs.
6It does, however, when every good is consumed by at least two agents in x.
18The ﬁrst one, dealing with marginal rates ofsubstitution, is essentially
Nagahisa’s (1991) ‘Local Independence’:7
Independence of Preferences except MRS (IP-MRS): ∀x ∈ F,




then x ∈ S ¯ R(R) ⇔ x ∈ S ¯ R(R ).
The next axiom says that only the parts ofindiﬀerence sets concerning
feasible allocations should matter.
Independence of Preferences except Indiﬀerence Sets on Feasible
Allocations (IP-ISFA): ∀x ∈ F, ∀R,R  ∈R n, if ∀i ∈ N,
I(xi,R i) ∩ Ω(ω)=I(xi,R
 
i) ∩ Ω(ω),
then x ∈ S ¯ R(R) ⇔ x ∈ S ¯ R(R ).
Although these independence conditions may seem restrictive, they are
actually not really stronger than the previous IIA axioms.
Proposition 3 On the class of ARSOFs that never select 0=( 0 ,...,0),
IIA-MRS ⇒ IP-MRS, and IIA-ISFA ⇒ IP-ISFA.
Proof. IIA-MRS ⇒ IP-MRS. Let x ∈ S ¯ R(R) and R  be such that for all
i ∈ N, C(xi,R  
i)=C(xi,R i). Notice that 0 = (0,...,0) / ∈ S ¯ R(R). Since
for all i ∈ N, C(0,R  
i)=C(0,R i)=R 
+, and xi Ri 0 ⇔ xi R 
i 0, and
0 Ri xi ⇔ 0 R 
i xi, it follows from IIA-MRS that x ∈ S ¯ R(R ) and 0 / ∈ S ¯ R(R ).
IIA-ISFA⇒IP-ISFA. Let x ∈ S ¯ R(R) and R  be such that for all i ∈ N,
I(xi,R i) ∩ Ω(ω)=I(xi,R  
i) ∩ Ω(ω). Notice that for all i ∈ N, I(0,R  
i)=
I(0,R i)={0}. Then, by IIA-ISFA, x ∈ S ¯ R(R ).
It is also easy to check that IP-MRS implies IIA-MRS, and that, for
ARSOFs which never select allocations x such that

i∈N xi  = ω, IP-ISFA
implies IIA-ISFA. In other words, for all practical purposes, the distinction
between the IP axioms introduced here and their IIA counterparts is negli-
gible.
7See also Yoshihara (1998).
196 Informational requirements for allocation
rules
Even though the allocation rule characterized in Theorem 1 above is fully
anonymous, it is not appealing because it contains only strongly unequal
allocations. A minimal requirement ofequality is the f ollowing:
Equal Treatment of Equals (for ARSOFs): ∀R ∈R n, ∀x ∈ S ¯ R(R),
∀i,j ∈ N, if Ri = Rj, then xi Ii xj.
This requirement is very minimal, and one may notice that any ARSOF
¯ R satisfying Anonymity and essential single-valuedness necessarily satisﬁes
Equal Treatment ofEquals.
From the statement and the proofofTheorem 1 we immediately deduce:
Corollary 1 There is no ARSOF satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA and
Equal Treatment of Equals.8 There is no essentially single-valued ARSOF
satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA and Anonymity.
The question we ask in this section is how much IIA needs to be weakened,
or how much additional information is needed in order to obtain the existence
ofan ARSOF satisf ying the above sets ofconditions.
Our ﬁrst result is that with IIA-MRS, a possibility is obtained, but there
remains a diﬃculty about essential single-valuedness.
Theorem 2 There exists an ARSOF satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA-MRS,
Equal Treatment of Equals and Anonymity. There is no essentially single-
valued ARSOF satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA-MRS and Equal Treatment
of Equals. There is no essentially single-valued ARSOF satisfying Pareto-
Eﬃciency, IIA-MRS and Anonymity.
Proof. The possibility is illustrated by the Egalitarian Walrasian ARSOF
¯ RSW.
The second impossibility is implied by the ﬁrst impossibility because es-
sential single-valuedness and Anonymity imply Equal Treatment ofEquals.
To show the ﬁrst impossibility, suppose, to the contrary, that there exists
8A slightly diﬀerent proof obtains by showing that the only constant ARSOF satisfying
Equal Treatment of Equals selects the egalitarian allocation giving ω/n to every agent,
which is not Pareto-eﬃcient in general.
20an essentially single-valued ARSOF ¯ R satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA-MRS
and Equal Treatment ofEquals. By Pareto-Eﬃciency, f or all R ∈R n,
0=( 0 ,...,0) / ∈ S ¯ R(R). Hence, from Proposition 3, ¯ R satisﬁes IP-MRS.
Let R∗ be the subset of R such any R ∈R ∗ is representable by a utility
function of the following kind:
u(x1,...,x )=f1(x1)+... + f (x ),
where for all k ∈{ 1,..., },f k is continuous, increasing, concave, and diﬀer-
entiable over R++, with limx→0 f 
k(x)=+ ∞. The relevant property ofthis
domain is that for all R ∈ (R∗)
n ,
E(R) ⊆{ x ∈ R
 
+ |∀ i ∈ N, xi   0o rxi =0 }.
Let R ∈ (R∗)
n be given.
Firstly, suppose that there is x ∈ S ¯ R(R) \ SW(R). By Pareto-Eﬃciency
x ∈ E(R). Hence, we have xi   0o rxi = 0 for all i ∈ N, and by dif-
ferentiability of preferences there is a shadow price vector p ∈ R 
++ such
that
∀i ∈ N, C(xi,R i)={λp | λ ∈ R++} or xi =0 .
For this p, deﬁne Rp ∈Rby
∀z,z




  ⇔ p · z ≥ p · z
 .
Let Rp =( Rp,...,Rp) ∈R n. By IP-MRS, x ∈ S ¯ R(Rp). Since x/ ∈ SW(R),
there exist i,j ∈ N such that xi Pp xj, in contradiction to Equal Treatment
ofEquals. As a consequence, S ¯ R(R) ⊂ SW(R).
Secondly, suppose that there is x ∈ SW(R) \ S ¯ R(R). For all i ∈ N, let
R  ∈ (R∗)
n be a proﬁle ofhomothetic (a given R in R∗ is homothetic ifall
its component functions fk are homogeneous ofthe same degree) and strictly
convex preferences satisfying
∀i ∈ N, C(xi,R
 
i)=C(xi,R i).
We have x ∈ SW(R ). Moreover, by Theorem 1 in Eisenberg (1961), all
allocations in SW(R ) are Pareto-indiﬀerent. By strict convexity ofpref er-
ences, one therefore has SW(R )={x}. Since, by the previous argument,
S ¯ R(R ) ⊂ SW(R ), we have S ¯ R(R )={x}. By IP-MRS, x ∈ S ¯ R(R), which is
a contradiction. Therefore SW(R) ⊂ S ¯ R(R).
21In conclusion, S ¯ R(R)=SW(R) for all R ∈ (R∗)
n. But SW is not essen-
tially single-valued on the whole domain (R∗)
n . This contradicts essential
single-valuedness of S ¯ R.
Only with IIA-ISFA do we really obtain a full possibility result.
Theorem 3 There exists an essentially single-valued ARSOF satisfying
Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA-ISFA, Anonymity and Equal Treatment of Equals.
Proof. Consider the Pazner-Schmeidler ARSOF ¯ RSPS, deﬁned at the end
ofsection 4. It obviously satisﬁes Pareto-Eﬃciency, Anonymity and Equal
Treatment ofEquals. To check that it satisﬁes IIA-ISFA, let x,y ∈ F and
R,R  ∈R n be such that for all i ∈ N,
I(xi,R i) ∩ Ω(ω(x,y)) = I(xi,R
 
i) ∩ Ω(ω(x,y))
I(yi,R i) ∩ Ω(ω(x,y)) = I(yi,R
 
i) ∩ Ω(ω(x,y)),
and x ∈ SPS(R) and y/ ∈ SPS(R). Let α ∈ R+ be such that for all i ∈ N,
xi Ii αω. Then, necessarily α<1. Notice that

i∈N xi = ω because
x ∈ E(R). Hence, Ω(ω(x,y)) = Ω(ω), and αω ∈ Ω(ω(x,y)). Together with
the above equalities, we deduce that x ∈ SPS(R ) and y/ ∈ SPS(R ).
7 Under Weak Pareto, social ordering func-
tions need more information
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996), in this model, showed that there exist many
SOFs satisfying Weak Pareto, Anonymity and the following weak version of
IIA:
IIA except Whole Indiﬀerence Sets (IIA-WIS): ∀x,y ∈ F, ∀R,R  ∈







then x ¯ R(R) y ⇔ x ¯ R(R ) y.
This axiom is weaker than all IIA axioms considered above, and one may
ask what is the minimal amount ofinf ormation needed by a SOF in order
22to satisfy Weak Pareto and Anonymity (or Non-Dictatorship). In Fleurbaey,
Suzumura and Tadenuma (2001), we showed that no SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak
Pareto, Non-Dictatorship (over the subset X ofallocations in which no agent
has a zero bundle), and either IIA-MRS or IIA-ISFA.
But these results were obtained in the particular case ofunbounded re-
sources F = Rn 
+ . The bounded case on which we focus here has attracted
less attention in the social choice literature,9 and here we have the following
result.
Theorem 4 There is no SOF ¯ R satisfying Weak Pareto, IIA-MRS and
Anonymity. There is no SOF ¯ R satisfying Weak Pareto, IIA-ISFA and
Anonymity.
Proof. In order to prove the impossibility, it is convenient to consider dif-










Case n =2 . Consider the bundles x =( 8 ,1/2,0,...),y= (12,1/2,0,...),
z =( 1 /2,12,0,...),w=( 1 /2,8,0,...). Let preferences R1 and R2 be deﬁned
as follows. On the subset
S1 = {v ∈ R
 
+|∀i ∈{ 3,..., },v i = 0 and v2 ≤ min{v1,1}}
one has
vR1v





and on the subset
S2 = {v ∈ R
 
+|∀i ∈{ 3,..., },v i = 0 and v1 ≤ min{v2,1}},
one has
vR1v





On B(x) ∪ B(y), one has
vR1v













9An exception is Bordes, Campbell and Le Breton (1995), in which Arrow’s theorem
is extended to the case of a bounded set of allocations.
23and on B(z) ∪ B(w),
vR1v














w1 +( 1− w1)+2[w2 − 2(1− w1)] >x 1 +2 x2
and
2[y1 − 2(1− y2)] + y2 +( 1− y2) > 2z1 + z2,
it is possible to complete the deﬁnition of R1 such that wP1x and yP1z.
Then deﬁne R2 so that it coincides with R1 on S1 ∪ S2, and on B(a) for all
a ∈{ x,y,z,w}. Similarly, it is possible to complete the deﬁnition of R2 such
that xP2w and zP2y. Figure 3 illustrates this construction.
✲














































Figure 3: Construction of R1 and R2
Ifthe proﬁle ofpref erences is R =( R1,R 2), by Weak Pareto one has:
(y,x) ¯ P(R)(z,w) and (w,z) ¯ P(R)(x,y).
Ifthe proﬁle ofpref erences is R  =( R1,R 1), by Anonymity one has:
(y,x)¯ I(R
 )(x,y) and (w,z)¯ I(R
 )(z,w).
24Since R1 and R2 coincide on S1 ∪S2, and on B(a) for all a ∈{ x,y,z,w},
by IIA-MRS or IIA-ISFA, one has:
(y,x)¯ I(R
 )(x,y) ⇔ (y,x)¯ I(R)(x,y)
and (w,z)¯ I(R
 )(z,w) ⇔ (w,z)¯ I(R)(z,w).
By transitivity, one gets (x,y) ¯ P(R)(x,y), which is impossible.
Case n =3 . Consider the bundles x =( 8 ,1/3,0,...),y= (12,1/3,0,...),
t = (10,1/3,0,...),z=( 1 /3,12,0,...),w=( 1 /3,8,0,...),r=( 1 /3,10,0,...).
Let preferences R1, R2 and R3 be deﬁned as above on the subset S1 ∪ S2,
and on B(a) for all a ∈{ x,y,z,w}. Complete their deﬁnition so that yP1z,
wP1x, tP2r, zP2y, xP3w, rP3t.
Ifthe proﬁle ofpref erences is R =( R1,R 2,R 3), by Weak Pareto one has:
(y,t,x)¯ P(R)(z,r,w) and (w,z,r) ¯ P(R)(x,y,t).
Ifthe proﬁle ofpref erences is R  =( R1,R 1,R 1), by Anonymity one has:
(y,t,x)¯ I(R
 )(x,y,t) and (w,z,r)¯ I(R
 )(z,r,w).
Since R1,R 2 and R3 coincide on S1 ∪ S2, and on B(a) for all a ∈
{x,y,z,w}, by IIA-MRS or IIA-ISFA, one has:
(y,t,x)¯ I(R
 )(x,y,t) ⇔ (y,t,x)¯ I(R)(x,y,t)
and (w,z,r)¯ I(R
 )(z,r,w) ⇔ (w,z,r)¯ I(R)(z,r,w).
By transitivity, one gets (x,y,t) ¯ P(R)(x,y,t), which is impossible.
Case n =2 k. Partition the population into k pairs, and construct an
argument similar to the case n =2 , with the bundles x =( 8 ,1/n,0,...),
y = (12,1/n,0,...),z=( 1 /n,12,0,...),w=( 1 /n,8,0,...), and the allocations
(y,x,y,x,...), (x,y,x,y,...), (z,w,z,w,...) and (w,z,w,z,...).
Case n =2 k +1 . Partition the population into k − 1 pairs and one
triple, and construct an argument combining the cases n = 2 and n =3 ,
with the bundles x =( 8 ,1/n,0,...),y= (12,1/n,0,...),t= (10,1/n,0,...),
z =( 1 /n,12,0,...),w=( 1 /n,8,0,...),r=( 1 /n,10,0,...), and the al-
locations (y,x,y,x,...,y,t,x), (x,y,x,y,...,x,y,t), (z,w,z,w,...z, r,w) and
(w,z,w,z,...,w,z,r).
This result proves that under Weak Pareto, more information about pref-
erences is needed than under Pareto-Eﬃciency. In that sense, it is true that
25the theory of fairness, with its coarse orderings, is less demanding in infor-
mation than the theory ofsocial choice.
As explained in Fleurbaey, Suzumura and Tadenuma (2001), however,
one should not conclude from this analysis that full knowledge of indiﬀerence
curves is needed under Weak Pareto. Deﬁne the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF ¯ RPS
as follows: x ¯ R(R) y ifand only if
min{α ∈ R+ |∃ i ∈ N, αω Ri xi}≥min{α ∈ R+ |∃ i ∈ N, αω Ri yi}.
This SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Anonymity, even though it only requires
knowledge ofthe intersection ofindiﬀerence curves with a ray f rom the origin.
In addition, although this SOF does not satisfy IIA-ISFA in the current








with no free disposal, instead of F, are ranked.
8 Toward a uniﬁed theory
There have been many attempts to import fairness concepts into social choice,
and thereby build a uniﬁed theory, such as Feldman and Kirman (1974),
Varian (1976), Suzumura (1981a,b, 1983) and Tadenuma (2002). But they
did not focus on the informational requirements to obtain positive results.
Our approach provides a uniﬁed framework which covers the theory of
social choice and the theory of fairness. Because ARs in the theory of fairness
are isomorphic to ARSOFs in the theory ofsocial choice, and ARSOFs are
just a particular kind ofSOF, the concept ofSOF is comprehensive enough
to encompass all relevant notions. This shows how the theory off airness is,
rigorously, a part ofthe theory ofsocial choice.
As a consequence, the way in which possibility results are obtained with
ARs, by broadening the informational basis, can be adopted for SOFs, albeit,
as shown above, the amount ofadditional inf ormation needed is greater.
From this perspective, there is no longer any reason to view the theory of
social choice as plagued with impossibilities, and no longer any reason for
social choice theorists to envy fairness theorists and their positive results.
26The same recipe for success can be adopted by social choice theorists.10
In this section we examine two possible objections to this proposed inte-
gration off air allocation theory into social choice theory. The ﬁrst objection
would go by recollecting that the celebrated Arrow Program ofsocial choice
theory consists oftwo separate steps, viz., (a) the construction ofa social
preference ordering corresponding to each and every proﬁle of individual
preference orderings; and (b) the construction of a social choice function in
terms ofthe optimization ofsocial pref erences within each and every set of
feasible social alternatives. The ﬁrst step, which may be called the preference
aggregation stage, is meant to determine the uniform social objective before
the set off easible social alternatives is revealed. The second step, which may
be called the social choice stage, is meant to determine the rational social
choice after the set of feasible social alternatives is revealed. Even though
in the theory off air allocation we may construct a coarse social ordering
in terms of the fair allocations versus unfair allocations, such an ordering
hinges squarely on the speciﬁcation ofthe set off easible allocations. Thus,
the objection goes, in view ofthe basic scenario ofthe Arrow Program of
social choice theory, the theory off air allocation does not really oﬀer much
to the preference aggregation stage of social choice theory.
Our response to this objection is that what is called “social choice theory”
in this paper actually encompasses the preference aggregation stage of the
Arrow program, as presented above, as a particular case. We believe that
it is quite convenient to see the common formal structure in all exercises of
construction ofa pref erence ordering over a set ofalternatives, whether this
set is determined by feasibility constraints or not. In this paper, the need to
compare the social choice approach and the fair allocation approach has led
us to retain
F = {x ∈ R
 
+ | x1 + ... + xn ≤ ω}
as the relevant set ofalternatives. An orthodox vision ofthe Arrow Program
ofsocial choice theory might possibly require the construction ofthe social
preference ordering to be made on the full set Rn 
+ , rather than F, but we
do not think that the construction ofa social pref erence ordering over F
should be excluded from social choice theory for that reason.11 Moreover, the
10For characterizations of SOFs based on fairness axioms, see e.g. Fleurbaey and Mani-
quet (2000, 2001).
11Arrow himself was actually vague about the set of alternatives in his monograph on
social choice. For instance, in the economic example he introduces in chap. 6, sect. 4, he
27notion of feasibility itself is multi-faceted. Although F is determined by some
feasibility constraints, the set of actually feasible alternatives, in practical
applications, is likely to be a strict subset of F. For instance, the political
system may give special value to a status quo x0, and restrict attention
to another particular alternative x, introduced as a proposed reform of the
status quo. In order to decide whether x is better than x0 or not, a ﬁne-
grained ranking ofall members of F is quite useful, and a ranking of all
members of Rn 
+ would be perfectly adequate as well, but would be more
than needed.
The second objection to our uniﬁcation would rely on an alternative way
of unifying the two theories, which has been elegantly formulated in Fish-
burn (1973) and adapted to economic environments by Le Breton (1997). It
consists in broadening the concept ofAR, as done in the theory ofsocial
choice based on social decision rules (SDR).
Let F denote the set ofnon-empty subsets of F, and let A⊂F. An SDR
is a mapping ¯ S from Rn ×Ato F such that for all R ∈R n, all A ∈A ,
¯ S(R,A) ⊂ A and ¯ S(R,A)  = ∅. The subset A is called an agenda, and A is
the class ofagendas.
An AR is just a particular kind ofSDR, f or which A = {F}. And one can
recover a SOF from an SDR if A contains all pairs ofallocations {x,y}⊂F
and satisﬁes a choice consistency condition. The derived SOF ¯ R¯ S is then
deﬁned by:
x ¯ R¯ S(R) y ⇔ x ∈ ¯ S(R,{x,y}).
In this perspective, the speciﬁcity ofthe theory off airness is that it has
a very restricted class ofagendas. This expresses the f act that the theory
of fairness only seeks the good allocations among all feasible ones, whereas
the theory ofsocial choice wants to make ﬁne-grained selections in most
conceivable agendas.
That possibility results are obtained in the theory off airness is likely to
be interpreted, in this approach, as due to the restricted agendas, and this
reinforces the usual explanation which opposes ﬁne-grained social preferences
and selection. But this would be a hasty conclusion. Arrow’s independence
condition, applied to SDRs, is formulated as follows in Le Breton (1997):
simply states: ‘Suppose that among the possible alternatives there are three, none of which
gives any individual at least as much of both commodities as any other.’ (Arrow 1963, p.
68; emphasis added) Bordes, Campbell and Le Breton (1995) study Arrow’s theorem on
F as a relevant social choice exercise.
28Independence of Infeasible Alternatives (IIF): ∀R,R  ∈R n, ∀A ∈A ,
if ∀i ∈ N,
∀x,y ∈ A : xi Ri yi ⇔ xi R
 
i yi,
then ¯ S(R,A)=¯ S(R ,A).
When the class ofagendas is restricted, the amount ofinf ormation about
preferences that may be used by ¯ S when considering to choose x as against
y increases automatically, because the subset A on which preference infor-
mation is retained is larger. Therefore going to restricted agendas has two
consequences. First, it makes one go from ﬁne-grained preferences to coarse
preferences, as emphasized by the usual explanation of the possibility results
in fairness theory. Second, and, we believe, more importantly, it increases the
amount of relevant information about preferences, as delineated by IIF.
Although the two uniﬁed theories (in terms ofSOFs or in terms ofSDRs)
are essentially isomorphic, we are inclined to think that the SOF approach
developed in this paper is more suitable to the analysis ofthe inf ormational
basis ofthe various theories. For instance, consider the Egalitarian Walrasian
AR which only needs knowledge ofmarginal rates ofsubstitution to decide
whether an allocation is selected or not. In the SOF approach, this is easily
captured by the IIA-MRS axiom, which is clearly a weakening ofIIA. In the
SDR approach, there is no as easy a way to modify IIF in order to capture
the same idea. Because in order to check that ¯ S(R,F)=¯ S(R ,F), that
is, SW(R)= SW(R ), one needs to know marginal rates ofsubstitutions at
many allocations, and this requires global knowledge of R over a large subset
ofallocations. Moreover, SW, viewed as an SDR, does not even satisfy IIF
because at corner allocations marginal rates ofsubstitution may depend on
preferences outside F.
9 Conclusion
In the traditional theory ofsocial choice in economic environments, Fleur-
baey, Suzumura and Tadenuma (2001) have shown that the construction of
an Arrovian social ordering function, in a framework with purely ordinal,
non-comparable preferences, requires information about the shape of indif-
ference curves that goes well beyond purely local data such as marginal rates
ofsubstitution.
The main lesson ofthis paper is that even f or the less ambitious project
29ofconstructing allocation rules, it is also necessary to introduce more inf or-
mation than allowed by the Arrovian independence ofirrelevant alternatives.
And the second lesson is that, nonetheless, a purely local information such as
marginal rates ofsubstitution is suﬃcient (or almost so) f or allocation rules,
whereas it is not so for social ordering functions.
We hope that our paper, more broadly, contributes to clarifying the infor-
mational f oundations in the theory ofsocial choice and in the theory off air
allocation, and also to clarifying the links and diﬀerences between these two
theories. Our proposal for a uniﬁed theory of social choice, where possibility
results from the fairness part can be extended to SOFs, should shake oﬀ the
negative fame of social choice.
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